Open AccessHigh-value decisions are fast and accurate, inconsistent with diminishing value sensitivity
Author(s) -
Blair R.K. Shevlin,
Stephanie M. Smith,
Jan Hausfeld,
Ian Krajbich
Publication year - 2022
Publication title -
proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the united states of america
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 1091-6490
pISSN - 0027-8424
DOI - 10.1073/pnas.2101508119
Subject(s) - value (mathematics) , normative , econometrics , subjective expected utility , contrast (vision) , psychology , context (archaeology) , cognitive psychology , social psychology , normalization (sociology) , economics , positive economics , statistics , expected utility hypothesis , mathematical economics , computer science , mathematics , epistemology , artificial intelligence , sociology , paleontology , philosophy , anthropology , biology
Significance What information about economic value is incorporated into decision-makers’ choices? Across the decision sciences, several prominent models ignore average value, assuming that only value differences are incorporated into the decision-making process, while others assume diminishing sensitivity to value, suggesting that it should be more difficult to choose between high-value options. Other models suggest that high-value decisions should, if anything, be treated as less important (holding value difference constant). Across three experiments with very different types of choices (food, art, and learned stimuli), we find violations of these predictions. Contrary to expectations, the presence of high-value options makes decisions easier while also inducing more effort to get them right.