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Post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms, especially those based on thelearning with errors (LWE) problem, have been subjected to several physicalattacks in the recent past. Although the attacks broadly belong to two classes- passive side-channel attacks and active fault attacks, the attack strategiesvary significantly due to the inherent complexities of such algorithms.Exploring further attack surfaces is, therefore, an important step foreventually securing the deployment of these algorithms. Also, it is importantto test the robustness of the already proposed countermeasures in this regard.In this work, we propose a new fault attack on side-channel secure maskedimplementation of LWE-based key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) exploitingfault propagation. The attack typically originates due to an algorithmicmodification widely used to enable masking, namely the Arithmetic-to-Boolean(A2B) conversion. We exploit the data dependency of the adder carry chain inA2B and extract sensitive information, albeit masking (of arbitrary order)being present. As a practical demonstration of the exploitability of thisinformation leakage, we show key recovery attacks of Kyber, although theleakage also exists for other schemes like Saber. The attack on Kyber targetsthe decapsulation module and utilizes Belief Propagation (BP) for key recovery.To the best of our knowledge, it is the first attack exploiting an algorithmiccomponent introduced to ease masking rather than only exploiting the randomnessintroduced by masking to obtain desired faults (as done by Delvaux). Finally,we performed both simulated and electromagnetic (EM) fault-based practicalvalidation of the attack for an open-source first-order secure Kyberimplementation running on an STM32 platform.

Carry Your Fault: A Fault Propagation Attack on Side-Channel Protected LWE-based KEM