English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

In the QBist approach to quantum mechanics, a measurement is an action anagent takes on the world external to herself. A measurement device is anextension of the agent and both measurement outcomes and their probabilitiesare personal to the agent. According to QBism, nothing in the quantum formalismimplies either that the quantum state assignments of two agents or theirrespective measurement outcomes need to be mutually consistent. Recently,Khrennikov has claimed that QBism's personalist theory of quantum measurementis invalidated by Ozawa's so-called intersubjectivity theorem. Here, followingStacey, we refute Khrennikov's claim by showing that it is not Ozawa'smathematical theorem but an additional assumption made by Khrennikov that QBismis incompatible with. We then address the question of intersubjective agreementin QBism more generally. Even though there is never a necessity for two agentsto agree on their respective measurement outcomes, a QBist agent can strive tocreate conditions under which she would expect another agent's reportedmeasurement outcome to agree with hers. It turns out that the assumptions ofOzawa's theorem provide an example for just such a condition.

When will two agents agree on a quantum measurement outcome? Intersubjective agreement in QBism