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Population games model the evolution of strategic interactions among a largenumber of uniform agents. Due to the agents' uniformity and quantity, theiraggregate strategic choices can be approximated by the solutions of a class ofordinary differential equations. This mean-field approach has found to be aneffective tool of analysis. However its current proofs rely on advancedmathematical techniques, making them less accessible. In this article, wepresent a simpler derivation, using only undergraduate-level probability.

Differential Equation Approximations for Population Games using Elementary Probability