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Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In thisregard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeatedgames in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, beeninsufficient attention paid to the robustness of a large set of equilibria thatis needed for such folk theorems. Starting with perfect public equilibrium asour starting point, we study uniformly strict equilibria in repeated games withprivate monitoring and direct communication (cheap talk). We characterize thelimit equilibrium payoff set and identify the conditions for the folk theoremto hold with uniformly strict equilibrium.

Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication