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We demonstrate that, in itself and in the absence of extra premises, thefollowing argument scheme is fallacious: The sentence A says about itself thatit has a certain property F, and A does in fact have the property F; thereforeA is true. We then examine an argument of this form in the informalintroduction of Goedel's classic (1931) and examine some auxiliary premiseswhich might have been at work in that context. Philosophically significant asit may be, that particular informal argument plays no role in Goedel'stechnical results. Going deeper into the issue and investigating truthconditions of Goedelian sentences (i.e., those sentences which are provablyequivalent to their own unprovability) will provide us with insights regardingthe philosophical debate on the truth of Goedelian sentences of systems--adebate which is at least as old as Dummett (1963).

On a fallacy concerning I-am-unprovable sentences: what to take home from Goedel's introduction