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Commonly, the strategy revision phase in evolutionary games relies on payoffcomparison. Namely, agents compare their payoff with the opponent, assessingwhether changing strategy can be potentially convenient. Even tiny payoffdifferences can be crucial in this decision process.  In this work, we study the dynamics of cooperation in the Public Goods Game,introducing a threshold $\epsilon$ in the strategy revision phase. In doing so,payoff differences narrower than $\epsilon$ entail the decision process reducesto a coin flip.  Interestingly, with ordinary agents, results show that payoff thresholds curbthe emergence of cooperation. Yet, the latter can be sustained by thesethresholds if the population is composed of conformist agents, which replacethe random-based revision with selecting the strategy of the majority.  To conclude, agents sensible only to consistent payoff differences mayrepresent 'real-world' individuals unable to properly appreciate advantages ordisadvantages when facing a dilemma. These agents may be detrimental to theemergence of cooperation or, on the contrary, supportive when endowed with aconformist attitude.

Strategy Revision Phase with Payoff Threshold in the Public Goods Game