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The authentication ceremony plays a crucial role in verifying the identitiesof users before exchanging messages in end-to-end encryption (E2EE)applications, thus preventing impersonation and man-in-the-middle (MitM)attacks. Once authenticated, the subsequent communications in E2EE apps benefitfrom the protection provided by the authentication ceremony. However, thecurrent implementation of the authentication ceremony in the Zoom applicationintroduces a potential vulnerability that can make it highly susceptible toimpersonation attacks. The existence of this vulnerability may undermine theintegrity of E2EE, posing a potential security risk when E2EE becomes amandatory feature in the Zoom application. In this paper, we examine andevaluate this vulnerability in two attack scenarios, one where the attacker isa malicious participant and another where the attacker is a malicious Zoomserver with control over Zoom's server infrastructure and cloud providers. Ourstudy aims to comprehensively examine the Zoom authentication ceremony, with aspecific focus on the potential for impersonation attacks in static media andtextual communications. We simulate a new session injection attack on Zoom E2EEmeetings to evaluate the system's susceptibility to simple voice manipulations.Our simulation experiments show that Zoom's authentication ceremony isvulnerable to a simple voice manipulation, called a VOICE-ZEUS attack, bymalicious participants and the malicious Zoom server. In this VOICE-ZEUSattack, an attacker creates a fingerprint in a victim's voice by reorderingpreviously recorded digits spoken by the victim. We show how an attacker canrecord and reorder snippets of digits to generate a new security code thatcompromises a future Zoom meeting. We conclude that stronger security measuresare necessary during the group authentication ceremony in Zoom to preventimpersonation attacks.

VOICE-ZEUS: Impersonating Zoom's E2EE-Protected Static Media and Textual Communications via Simple Voice Manipulations