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Byzantine consensus protocols aim at maintaining safety guarantees under anynetwork synchrony model and at providing liveness in partially or fullysynchronous networks. However, several Byzantine consensus protocols have beenshown to violate liveness properties under certain scenarios. Existing testingmethods for checking the liveness of consensus protocols check for time-boundedliveness violations, which generate a large number of false positives. In thiswork, for the first time, we check the liveness of Byzantine consensusprotocols using the temperature and lasso detection methods, which require thedefinition of ad-hoc system state abstractions. We focus on the HotStuffprotocol family that has been recently developed for blockchain consensus. Inthis family, the HotStuff protocol is both safe and live under the partialsynchrony assumption, while the 2-Phase Hotstuff and Sync HotStuff protocolsare known to violate liveness in subtle fault scenarios. We implemented ourliveness checking methods on top of the Twins automated unit test generator totest the HotStuff protocol family. Our results indicate that our methodssuccessfully detect all known liveness violations and produce fewer falsepositives than the traditional time-bounded liveness checks.

Liveness Checking of the HotStuff Protocol Family