English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

This paper focuses on the performance of equalizer zero-determinant (ZD)strategies in discounted repeated Stackerberg asymmetric games. In theleader-follower adversarial scenario, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE)deriving from the opponents' best response (BR), is technically the optimalstrategy for the leader. However, computing an SSE strategy may be difficultsince it needs to solve a mixed-integer program and has exponential complexityin the number of states. To this end, we propose to adopt an equalizer ZDstrategy, which can unilaterally restrict the opponent's expected utility. Wefirst study the existence of an equalizer ZD strategy with one-to-onesituations, and analyze an upper bound of its performance with the baseline SSEstrategy. Then we turn to multi-player models, where there exists one playeradopting an equalizer ZD strategy. We give bounds of the sum of opponents'utilities, and compare it with the SSE strategy. Finally, we give simulationson unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the moving target defense (MTD) toverify the effectiveness of our approach.

Equalizer zero-determinant strategy in discounted repeated Stackelberg asymmetric game