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A principal vulnerability of a proof-of-work ("PoW") blockchain is that anattacker can re-write the history of transactions by forking a previouslypublished block and build a new chain segment containing a different sequenceof transactions. If the attacker's chain has the most cumulative mining puzzledifficulty, nodes will recognize it as canonical. We propose a modification toPoW protocols, called ADESS, that contains two novel features. The firstmodification enables a node to identify the attacker chain by comparing thetemporal sequence of blocks on competing chains. The second modificationpenalizes the attacker by requiring it to apply exponentially increasinghashrate in order to make its chain canonical. We demonstrate two things; (i)the expected cost of carrying out a double-spend attack is weakly higher underADESS compared to the current PoW protocols and (ii) for any value oftransaction, there is a penalty setting in ADESS that renders the expectedprofit of a double-spend attack negative.

ADESS: A Proof-of-Work Protocol to Deter Double-Spend Attacks