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In diseases with long-term immunity, vaccination is known to increase theaverage age at infection as a result of the decrease in the pathogencirculation. This implies that a vaccination campaign can have negative effectswhen a disease is more costly (financial or health-related costs) for higherages. This work considers an age-structured population transmission model withimperfect vaccination. Our aim is to compare the social and individual costs ofvaccination, assuming that disease costs are age-dependent. A model couplingpathogen deterministic dynamics for a population consisting of juveniles andadults, both assumed to be rational agents, is introduced. The parameter regionfor which vaccination has a positive social impact is fully characterized andthe Nash equilibrium of the vaccination game is obtained. Finally, collectivestrategies designed to promote voluntary vaccination, without compromisingsocial welfare, are discussed.

Social \textit{vs.} individual age-dependent costs of imperfect vaccination