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Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a significant incentive onblockchain networks, referring to the value captured through the manipulationof transaction execution order and strategic issuance of profit-generationtransactions. We argue that transaction ordering techniques used for MEVextraction in blockchains where fees can influence the execution order do notdirectly apply to blockchains where the order is determined based ontransactions' arrival times. Such blockchains' First-Come-First-Served (FCFS)nature can yield different optimization strategies for entities seeking MEV,known as searchers, requiring further study. This paper explores theapplicability of MEV extraction techniques observed on Ethereum, a fee-basedblockchain, to Algorand, an FCFS blockchain. Our results show the prevalence ofarbitrage MEV getting extracted through backruns on pending transactions in thenetwork, uniformly distributed to block positions. However, on-chain data donot reveal latency optimizations between specific MEV searchers and Algorandblock proposers. We also study network clogging attacks and argue how searcherscan exploit them as a viable ordering technique for MEV extraction in FCFSnetworks.

A Study of MEV Extraction Techniques on a First-Come-First-Served Blockchain