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For decades, operational technology (OT) has enjoyed the luxury of beingsuitably inaccessible so as to experience directly targeted cyber attacks fromonly the most advanced and well-resourced adversaries. However, security viaobscurity cannot last forever, and indeed a shift is happening whereby lessadvanced adversaries are showing an appetite for targeting OT. With this shiftin adversary demographics, there will likely also be a shift in attack goals,from clandestine process degradation and espionage to overt cyber extortion(Cy-X). The consensus from OT cyber security practitioners suggests that, evenif encryption-based Cy-X techniques were launched against OT assets, typicalrecovery practices designed for engineering processes would provide adequateresilience. In response, this paper introduces Dead Man's PLC (DM-PLC), apragmatic step towards viable OT Cy-X that acknowledges and weaponises theresilience processes typically encountered. Using only existing functionality,DM-PLC considers an entire environment as the entity under ransom, whereby allassets constantly poll one another to ensure the attack remains untampered,treating any deviations as a detonation trigger akin to a Dead Man's switch. Aproof of concept of DM-PLC is implemented and evaluated on an academically peerreviewed and industry validated OT testbed to demonstrate its maliciousefficacy.

Dead Man's PLC: Towards Viable Cyber Extortion for Operational Technology