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Our ISCA 2014 paper provided the first scientific and detailedcharacterization, analysis, and real-system demonstration of what is nowpopularly known as the RowHammer phenomenon (or vulnerability) in moderncommodity DRAM chips, which are used as main memory in almost all moderncomputing systems. It experimentally demonstrated that more than 80% of allDRAM modules we tested from the three major DRAM vendors were vulnerable to theRowHammer read disturbance phenomenon: one can predictably induce bitflips(i.e., data corruption) in real DRAM modules by repeatedly accessing a DRAM rowand thus causing electrical disturbance to physically nearby rows. We showedthat a simple unprivileged user-level program induced RowHammer bitflips inmultiple real systems and suggested that a security attack can be built usingthis proof-of-concept to hijack control of the system or cause other harm. Tosolve the RowHammer problem, our paper examined seven different approaches(including a novel probabilistic approach that has very low cost), some ofwhich influenced or were adopted in different industrial products.  Many later works from various research communities examined RowHammer,building real security attacks, proposing new defenses, further analyzing theproblem at various (e.g., device/circuit, architecture, and system) levels, andexploiting RowHammer for various purposes (e.g., to reverse-engineer DRAMchips). Industry has worked to mitigate the problem, changing both memorycontrollers and DRAM standards/chips. Two major DRAM vendors finally wrotepapers on the topic in 2023, describing their current approaches to mitigateRowHammer. Research & development on RowHammer in both academia & industrycontinues to be very active and fascinating.  This short retrospective provides a brief analysis of our ISCA 2014 paper andits impact.

Retrospective: Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors