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We study a wireless jamming problem consisting of the competition between alegitimate receiver and a jammer, as a zero-sum game with the value tomaximize/minimize being the channel capacity at the receiver's side. Most ofthe approaches found in the literature consider the two players to bestationary nodes. Instead, we investigate what happens when they can changelocation, specifically moving along a linear geometry. We frame this at firstas a static game, which can be solved in closed form, and subsequently weextend it to a dynamic game, under three different versions for what concernscompleteness/perfection of mutual information about the adversary's position,corresponding to different assumptions of concealment/sequentiality of themoves, respectively. We first provide some theoretical conditions that hold forthe static game and also help identify good strategies valid under any setup,including dynamic games. Since dynamic games, although more realistic, arecharacterized by an exploding strategy space, we exploit reinforcement learningto obtain efficient strategies leading to equilibrium outcomes. We show howtheoretical findings can be used to train smart agents to play the game, andvalidate our approach in practical setups.

Static and Dynamic Jamming Games Over Wireless Channels With Mobile Strategic Players