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This work focuses on eliminating timing-side channels in real-timesafety-critical cyber-physical network protocols like Controller Area Networks(CAN). Automotive Electronic Control Units (ECUs) implement predictablescheduling decisions based on task level response time estimation. Such levelsof determinism exposes timing information about task executions and thereforecorresponding message transmissions via the network buses (that connect theECUs and actuators). With proper analysis, such timing side channels can beutilized to launch several schedule-based attacks that can lead to eventualdenial-of-service or man-in-the-middle-type attacks. To eliminate thisdeterminism, we propose a novel schedule obfuscation strategy by skippingcertain control task executions and related data transmissions along withrandom shifting of the victim task instance. While doing this, our strategycontemplates the performance of the control task as well by bounding the numberof control execution skips. We analytically demonstrate how the attack successprobability (ASP) is reduced under this proposed attack-aware skipping andrandomization. We also demonstrate the efficacy and real-time applicability ofour attack-aware schedule obfuscation strategy Hide-n-Seek by applying it tosynthesized automotive task sets in a real-time Hardware-in-loop (HIL) setup.

Concealing CAN Message Sequences to Prevent Schedule-based Bus-off Attacks