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In the context of reducing carbon emissions in the automotive supply chain,collaboration between vehicle manufacturers and retailers has proven to be aneffective measure for enhancing carbon emission reduction within theenterprise. This study aims to evaluate the effectiveness of such collaborationby constructing a differential game model that incorporates carbon trading andconsumer preferences for low-carbon products. The model examines thedecision-making process of an automotive supply chain comprising a vehiclemanufacturer and multiple retailers. By utilizing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmanequation, we analyze the equilibrium strategies of the participants under botha decentralized model and a Stackelberg leader-follower game model. In thedecentralized model, the vehicle manufacturer optimizes its carbon emissionreduction efforts, while each retailer independently determines its low-carbonpromotion efforts and vehicle retail price. In the Stackelberg leader-followergame model, the vehicle manufacturer cooperates with the retailers by offeringthem a subsidy. Consequently, the manufacturer plays as the leader, makingdecisions on carbon emission reduction efforts and the subsidy rate, while theretailers, as followers, compute their promotion efforts and retail pricesaccordingly. Through theoretical analysis and numerical experiments consideringthe manufacturer's and retailers' efforts, the low-carbon reputation ofvehicles, and the overall system profits under both models, we conclude thatcompared to the decentralized model, where each party pursues individualprofits, the collaboration in the Stackelberg game yields greater benefits forboth parties. Furthermore, this collaborative approach promotes the long-termdevelopment of the automotive supply chain.

Differential Game Analysis for Cooperation Models in Automotive Supply Chain under Low-Carbon Emission Reduction Policies