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Almost all courts to interpret Section 230 of the Communications Decency Acthave construed its ambiguously worded immunity provision broadly, shieldingInternet intermediaries from tort liability so long as they are not the literalauthors of offensive content. Although this broad interpretation effects thebasic goals of the statute, it ignores several serious textual difficulties andmistakenly extends protection too far by immunizing even direct participants intortuous conduct.  This analysis, which examines the text and history of Section 230 in light oftwo strains of pre-Internet vicarious liability defamation doctrine, concludesthat the immunity provision of Section 230, though broad, was not intended toabrogate entirely traditional common law notions of vicarious liability. Somebases of vicarious liability remain, and their continuing validity bothexplains the textual puzzles courts have faced in applying Section 230 andundergirds the push by a small minority of courts to narrow the section'simmunity provision.

An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act