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John S. Bell introduced the notion of beable, as opposed to the standardnotion of observable, in order to emphasize the need for an unambiguousformulation of quantum mechanics. In the paper I show that Bell formulated infact two different theories of beables. The first is somehow reminiscent of theBohr views on quantum mechanics but, at the same time, is curiously adopted byBell as a critical tool against the Copenhagen interpretation, whereas thesecond, more mature formulation was among the sources of inspiration of theso-called Primitive Ontology (PO) approach to quantum mechanics, an approachinspired to scientific realism. In the first part of the paper it is arguedthat, contrary to the Bell wishes, the first formulation of the theory fails tobe an effective recipe for addressing the ambiguity underlying the standardformulation of quantum mechanics, whereas it is only the second formulationthat successfully paves the way to the PO approach. In the second part, Iconsider how the distinction between the two formulations of the Bell theory ofbeables fares vis-a-vis the complex relationship between the theory of beablesand the details of the PO approach.

The Evolution of the Bell Notion of Beable: from Bohr to Primitive Ontology