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In this article, we develop an interdisciplinary analysis of MEV whichdesires to merge the gap that exists between technical and legal researchsupporting policymakers in their regulatory decisions concerning blockchains,DeFi and associated risks. Consequently, this article is intended for bothtechnical and legal audiences, and while we abstain from a detailed legalanalysis, we aim to open a policy discussion regarding decentralized governancedesign at the block building layer as the place where MEV occurs. MaximalExtractable Value or MEV has been one of the major concerns in blockchaindesigns as it creates a centralizing force which ultimately affects usertransactions. In this article, we dive into the technicality behind MEV, wherewe explain the concept behind the novel Proposal Builder Separation design asan effort by Flashbots to increase decentralization through modularity. Weunderline potential vulnerability factors under the PBS design, which openspace for MEV extracting adversarial strategies by inside participants. Wediscuss the shift of trust from validators to builders in PoS blockchains suchas Ethereum, acknowledging the impact that the later ones may have on users'transactions (in terms of front running) and censorship resistance (in terms oftransaction inclusion). We recognize that under PBS, centralized (dominant)entities such as builders could potentially harm users by extracting MEV viafront running strategies. Finally, we suggest adequate design and policymeasures which could potentially mitigate these negative effects whileprotecting blockchain users.

The MEV Saga: Can Regulation Illuminate the Dark Forest?