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Private and public actors increasingly encounter use cases where they need toimplement sensitive operations on mass-market peripherals for which they havelittle or no control. They are sometimes inclined to attempt this without usinghardware-assisted equipment, such as secure elements. In this case, thewhite-box attack model is particularly relevant and includes access to everyasset, retro-engineering, and binary instrumentation by attackers. At the sametime, quantum attacks are becoming more and more of a threat and challengetraditional asymmetrical ciphers, which are treasured by private and publicactors.  The McEliece cryptosystem is a code-based public key algorithm introduced in1978 that is not subject to well-known quantum attacks and that could beimplemented in an uncontrolled environment. During the NIST post-quantumcryptography standardization process, a derived candidate commonly refer to asclassic McEliece was selected. This algorithm is however vulnerable to somefault injection attacks while a priori, this does not apply to the originalMcEliece. In this article, we thus focus on the original McEliece cryptosystemand we study its resilience against fault injection attacks on an ARM referenceimplementation. We disclose the first fault injection based attack and wediscuss on how to modify the original McEliece cryptosystem to make itresilient to fault injection attacks.

Faulting original McEliece's implementations is possible: How to mitigate this risk?