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We present a model that investigates preference evolution with endogenousmatching. In the short run, individuals' subjective preferences influencepartner selection and behavior in strategic interactions, which affect theirmaterial payoffs. These payoffs, in turn, determine how preferences evolve inthe long run. To properly model the "match-to-interact" process, we combinestable matching and equilibrium concepts. Our analysis shows that endogenousmatching gives rise to the evolutionary stability of a class of preferencesthat exhibit both affinity bias and efficient play. Such preferences stand outin the evolutionary process because they are able to force positive assortativematching and joint payoff maximization. Under incomplete information, a strongform of affinity bias, parochialism, is necessary for a preference to prevailin evolution, because stronger incentives are required to engage inself-sorting with information friction.

Preference Evolution under Partner Choice