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Modern x86 processors support an AVX instruction set to boost performance.However, this extension may cause security issues. We discovered that there arevulnerable properties in implementing masked load/store instructions. Based onthis, we present a novel AVX timing side-channel attack that can defeat addressspace layout randomization. We demonstrate the significance of our attack byshowing User and Kernel ASLR breaks on the recent Intel and AMD processors invarious environments, including cloud computing systems, an SGX enclave (afine-grained ASLR break), and major operating systems. We further demonstratethat our attack can be used to infer user behavior, such as Bluetooth eventsand mouse movements. We highlight that stronger isolation or more fine-grainedrandomization should be adopted to successfully mitigate our presented attacks.

AVX Timing Side-Channel Attacks against Address Space Layout Randomization