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Security risks from AI have motivated calls for international agreements thatguardrail the technology. However, even if states could agree on what rules toset on AI, the problem of verifying compliance might make these agreementsinfeasible. To help clarify the difficulty of verifying agreements onAI$\unicode{x2013}$and identify actions that might reduce thisdifficulty$\unicode{x2013}$this report examines the case study of verificationin nuclear arms control. We review the implementation, track records, andpolitics of verification across three types of nuclear arms control agreements.Then, we consider implications for the case of AI, especially AI developmentthat relies on thousands of highly specialized chips. In this context, the casestudy suggests that, with certain preparations, the foreseeable challenges ofverification would be reduced to levels that were successfully managed innuclear arms control. To avoid even worse challenges, substantial preparationsare needed: (1) developing privacy-preserving, secure, and acceptably pricedmethods for verifying the compliance of hardware, given inspection access; and(2) building an initial, incomplete verification system, with authorities andprecedents that allow its gaps to be quickly closed if and when the politicalwill arises.

Nuclear Arms Control Verification and Lessons for AI Treaties