English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

In this work, we consider the framework of coalitional Blotto games in whichtwo players compete against a common adversary by allocating their budgetedresources across disjoint sets of valued battlefields; the agent that allocatesa higher amount wins the corresponding battlefield value. At the beginning ofthe game, the budgets of the agents and the values of the battlefields arespecified. In the first stage, the players are allowed to perform a battlefieldtransfer in which one player offloads a number of its battlefields onto theother player. In the second stage, the adversary observes this transfer anddetermines how to allocate their budget accordingly. Finally, in the thirdstage, the players and the adversary allocate their budgets to theirbattlefields, the game is played, and their payoffs are realized. We providenecessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a battlefield transferthat strictly increases the payoff of each player. We then augment the model,allowing players to not only transfer subsets of battlefields, but alsoportions of their budget, in the first stage. We also provide sufficientconditions for the existence of a joint transfer of battlefields and budgets.The results demonstrate that in almost all game instances, both players wouldbenefit from such a joint transfer.

Battlefield transfers in coalitional Blotto games