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Code-reuse attacks have become a kind of common attack method, in whichattackers use the existing code in the program to hijack the control flow. Mostexisting defenses focus on control flow integrity (CFI), code randomization,and software debloating. However, most fine-grained schemes of those thatensure such high security suffer from significant performance overhead, andonly reduce attack surfaces such as software debloating can not defend againstcode-reuse attacks completely. In this paper, from the perspective of shrinkingthe available code space at runtime, we propose LoadLord, which dynamicallyloads, and timely unloads functions during program running to defend againstcode-reuse attacks. LoadLord can reduce the number of gadgets in memory,especially high-risk gadgets. Moreover, LoadLord ensures the control flowintegrity of the loading process and breaks the necessary conditions to build agadget chain. We implemented LoadLord on Linux operating system andexperimented that when limiting only 1/16 of the original function. As aresult, LoadLord can defend against code-reuse attacks and has an averageruntime overhead of 1.7% on the SPEC CPU 2006, reducing gadgets by 94.02%.

LoadLord: Loading on the Fly to Defend Against Code-Reuse Attacks