English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

This paper studies an $N$--agent cost-coupled game where the agents areconnected via an unreliable capacity constrained network. Each agent receivesstate information over that network which loses packets with probability $p$. ABase station (BS) actively schedules agent communications over the network byminimizing a weighted Age of Information (WAoI) based cost function under acapacity limit $\mathcal{C} < N$ on the number of transmission attempts at eachinstant. Under a standard information structure, we show that the problem canbe decoupled into a scheduling problem for the BS and a game problem for the$N$ agents. Since the scheduling problem is an NP hard combinatorics problem,we propose an approximately optimal solution which approaches the optimalsolution as $N \rightarrow \infty$. In the process, we also provide someinsights on the case without channel erasure. Next, to solve the largepopulation game problem, we use the mean-field game framework to compute anapproximate decentralized Nash equilibrium. Finally, we validate thetheoretical results using a numerical example.

Large Population Games on Constrained Unreliable Networks