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Dynamic partial reconfiguration enables multi-tenancy in cloud-based FPGAs,which presents security challenges for tenants, IPs, and data. Malicious userscan exploit FPGAs for remote side-channel attacks (SCAs), and shared on-chipresources can be used for attacks. Logical separation can ensure designintegrity, but on-chip resources can still be exploited. Conventional SCAmitigation can help, but it requires significant effort, and bitstream checkingtechniques are not highly accurate. An active on-chip defense mechanism isneeded for tenant confidentiality. Toward this, we propose a lightweightshielding technique utilizing ring oscillators (ROs) to protect applicationsagainst remote power SCA. Unlike existing RO-based approaches, in ourmethodology, an offline pre-processing stage is proposed to carefully configurepower monitors and an obfuscating circuit concerning the resource constraintsof the board. Detection of power fluctuations due to application executionenables the obfuscating circuit to flatten the power consumption trace. Toevaluate the effectiveness of the proposed SHIELD, we implemented it on aXilinx Zynq-7000 FPGA board executing an RSA encryption algorithm. Due to theSHIELD, the number of traces required to extract the encryption key isincreased by 166x, making an attack extremely hard at run-time. Note that theproposed SHIELD does not require any modification in the target application.Our methodology also shows up to 54% less power consumption and up to 26% lessarea overhead than the state-of-the-art random noise-addition-based defense.

SHIELD: An Adaptive and Lightweight Defense against the Remote Power Side-Channel Attacks on Multi-tenant FPGAs