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This paper studies a general class of social choice problems in which agents'payoff functions (or types) are privately observable random variables, andmonetary transfers are not available. We consider cardinal social choicefunctions which may respond to agents' preference intensities as well aspreference rankings. We show that a social choice function is ex ante Paretoefficient and Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if it is dictatorial.The result holds for arbitrary numbers of agents and alternatives, and under afairly weak assumption on the joint distribution of types, which allows forarbitrary correlations and asymmetries.

A General Impossibility Theorem on Pareto Efficiency and Bayesian Incentive Compatibility