English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

Uncertainty in quality and the inspectors' imperfect testing capability leaveraw agricultural products (e.g., fresh produce, seafood, livestock and poultryproducts, etc.) wide open to economically motivated adulteration (EMA), and thestrong demand for online shopping of these products in China makes thissituation even worse. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic framework toinvestigate online raw agricultural product sellers' preemptive EMA behavior onan ecommerce platform (EP). Particularly, the sellers differ from each other inthe original quality of their products. We characterize the sellers'equilibrium pricing and adulteration decisions and the EP's optimal take ratedecision, and analyze how the sampling inspections and adulteration penaltyjointly impact these decisions. Moreover, we investigate three manageriallevers, such as claiming a higher-than-law-requires penalty, that theadministrative departments or the EP can use to deter EMA. Finally, we use thereal-word data from Taobao.com to calibrate our model and derive moremanagerial insights from the analytical findings. We find that the heterogenoussellers' adulteration decisions are symmetric and their ex-post pricingdecisions lead them to evenly share the market on the EP. Interestingly, weshow that the EP's higher take rate will inhibit the sellers' adulterationbehavior. However, the profit-maximizing EP may indulge the sellers'adulteration behavior by intentionally decreasing this rate. Our resultshighlight a penalty-inspection-centered approach as essential to combat EMA,and the three levels can play a role as supplements to this approach undercertain conditions.

Insight into China's Economically Motivated Adulteration Risk in Online Raw Agricultural Product Sales