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Searchable symmetric encryption enables private queries over an encrypteddatabase, but it also yields information leakages. Adversaries can exploitthese leakages to launch injection attacks (Zhang et al., USENIX'16) to recoverthe underlying keywords from queries. The performance of the existing injectionattacks is strongly dependent on the amount of leaked information or injection.In this work, we propose two new injection attacks, namely BVA and BVMA, byleveraging a binary volumetric approach. We enable adversaries to inject fewerfiles than the existing volumetric attacks by using the known keywords andreveal the queries by observing the volume of the query results. Our attackscan thwart well-studied defenses (e.g., threshold countermeasure, staticpadding) without exploiting the distribution of target queries and clientdatabases. We evaluate the proposed attacks empirically in real-world datasetswith practical queries. The results show that our attacks can obtain a highrecovery rate (>80%) in the best case and a roughly 60% recovery even under alarge-scale dataset with a small number of injections (<20 files).

High Recovery with Fewer Injections: Practical Binary Volumetric Injection Attacks against Dynamic Searchable Encryption