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The main goal of a sequential two-stage electricity market -- e.g., day-aheadand real-time markets -- is to operate efficiently. However, the pricedifference across stages due to inadequate competition and unforeseencircumstances leads to undesirable price manipulation. To mitigate this, someIndependent System Operators (ISOs) proposed system-level market powermitigation (MPM) policies in addition to existing local policies. Thesepolicies aim to substitute noncompetitive bids with a default bid based onestimated generator costs. However, these policies may lead to unintendedconsequences when implemented without accounting for the conflicting interestof participants. In this paper, we model the competition between generators(bidding supply functions) and loads (bidding quantity) in a two-stage marketwith a stage-wise MPM policy. An equilibrium analysis shows that a real-timeMPM policy leads to equilibrium loss, meaning no stable market outcome (Nashequilibrium) exists. A day-ahead MPM policy, besides, leads to aStackelberg-Nash game with loads acting as leaders and generators as followers.In this setting, loads become winners, i.e., their aggregate payment is alwaysless than competitive payments. Moreover, comparison with standard marketequilibrium highlights that markets are better off without such policies.Finally, numerical studies highlight the impact of heterogeneity and load sizeon market equilibrium.

Market Power Mitigation in Two-stage Electricity Market with Supply Function and Quantity Bidding