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Voice over LTE (VoLTE) and Voice over NR (VoNR) are two similar technologiesthat have been widely deployed by operators to provide a better callingexperience in LTE and 5G networks, respectively. The VoLTE/NR protocols rely onthe security features of the underlying LTE/5G network to protect users'privacy such that nobody can monitor calls and learn details about call times,duration, and direction. In this paper, we introduce a new privacy attack whichenables adversaries to analyse encrypted LTE/5G traffic and recover anyVoLTE/NR call details. We achieve this by implementing a novel mobile-relayadversary which is able to remain undetected by using an improved physicallayer parameter guessing procedure. This adversary facilitates the recovery ofencrypted configuration messages exchanged between victim devices and themobile network. We further propose an identity mapping method which enables ourmobile-relay adversary to link a victim's network identifiers to the phonenumber efficiently, requiring a single VoLTE protocol message. We evaluate thereal-world performance of our attacks using four modern commercialoff-the-shelf phones and two representative, commercial network carriers. Wecollect over 60 hours of traffic between the phones and the mobile networks andexecute 160 VoLTE calls, which we use to successfully identify patterns in thephysical layer parameter allocation and in VoLTE traffic, respectively. Ourreal-world experiments show that our mobile-relay works as expected in all testcases, and the VoLTE activity logs recovered describe the actual communicationwith 100% accuracy. Finally, we show that we can link network identifiers suchas International Mobile Subscriber Identities (IMSI), Subscriber ConcealedIdentifiers (SUCI) and/or Globally Unique Temporary Identifiers (GUTI) to phonenumbers while remaining undetected by the victim.

Watching your call: Breaking VoLTE Privacy in LTE/5G Networks