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In recent years, various decentralized organizational forms have emerged,posing a challenge for organizational design. Some design elements, such astask allocation, become emergent properties that cannot be fully controlledfrom the top down. The central question that arises in this context is: How canbottom-up task allocation be guided towards an effective organizationalstructure? To address this question, this paper presents a novel agent-basedmodel of an organization that features bottom-up task allocation that can bemotivated by either long-term or short-term orientation on the agents' side.The model also includes an incentive mechanism to guide the bottom-up taskallocation process and create incentives that range from altruistic toindividualistic. Our analysis shows that when bottom-up task allocation isdriven by short-term orientation and aligned with the incentive mechanisms, itleads to improved organizational performance that surpasses that oftraditionally designed organizations. Additionally, we find that the presenceof altruistic incentive mechanisms within the organization reduces theimportance of mirroring in task allocation.

Designing organizations for bottom-up task allocation: The role of incentives