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Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are the core control devices inIndustrial Control Systems (ICSs), which control and monitor the underlyingphysical plants such as power grids. PLCs were initially designed to work in atrusted industrial network, which however can be brittle once deployed in anInternet-facing (or penetrated) network. Yet, there is a lack of systematicempirical analysis of the run-time security of modern real-world PLCs. To closethis gap, we present the first large-scale measurement on 23 off-the-shelf PLCsacross 13 leading vendors. We find many common security issues and unexploredimplications that should be more carefully addressed in the design andimplementation. To sum up, the unsupervised logic applications can cause systemresource/privilege abuse, which gives adversaries new means to hijack thecontrol flow of a runtime system remotely (without exploiting memoryvulnerabilities); 2) the improper access control mechanisms bring manyunauthorized access implications; 3) the proprietary or semi-proprietaryprotocols are fragile regarding confidentiality and integrity protection ofrun-time data. We empirically evaluated the corresponding attack vectors onmultiple PLCs, which demonstrates that the security implications are severe andbroad. Our findings were reported to the related parties responsibly, and 20bugs have been confirmed with 7 assigned CVEs.

Towards Comprehensively Understanding the Run-time Security of Programmable Logic Controllers: A 3-year Empirical Study