English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

In this paper, we rigorously study the problem of cost optimisation of hybrid(mixed) institutional incentives, which are a plan of actions involving the useof reward and punishment by an external decision-maker, for maximising thelevel (or guaranteeing at least a certain level) of cooperative behaviour in awell-mixed, finite population of self-regarding individuals who interact viacooperation dilemmas (Donation Game or Public Goods Game). We show that a mixedincentive scheme can offer a more cost-efficient approach for providingincentives while ensuring the same level or standard of cooperation in thelong-run. We establish the asymptotic behaviour (namely neutral drift, strongselection, and infinite-population limits). We prove the existence of a phasetransition, obtaining the critical threshold of the strength of selection atwhich the monotonicity of the cost function changes and providing an algorithmfor finding the optimal value of the individual incentive cost. Our analyticalresults are illustrated with numerical investigations. Overall, our analysisprovides novel theoretical insights into the design of cost-efficientinstitutional incentive mechanisms for promoting the evolution of cooperationin stochastic systems.

Cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations