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Air-gapped systems are isolated from the Internet due to the sensitiveinformation they handle. This paper presents COVID-bit, a new COVert channelattack that leaks sensitive information over the air from highly isolatedsystems. The information emanates from the air-gapped computer over the air toa distance of 2m and more and can be picked up by a nearby insider or spy witha mobile phone or laptop. Malware on an air-gapped computer can generate radiowaves by executing crafted code on the target system. The malicious codeexploits the dynamic power consumption of modern computers and manipulates themomentary loads on CPU cores. This technique allows the malware to control thecomputer's internal utilization and generate low-frequency electromagneticradiation in the 0 - 60 kHz band. Sensitive information (e.g., files,encryption keys, biometric data, and keylogging) can be modulated over theemanated signals and received by a nearby mobile phone at a max speed of 1000bits/sec. We show that a smartphone or laptop with a small \$1 antenna carriedby a malicious insider or visitor can be used as a covert receiver. Notably,the attack is highly evasive since it executes from an ordinary user-levelprocess, does not require root privileges, and is effective even within aVirtual Machine (VM). We discuss the attack model and provide technicaldetails. We implement air-gap transmission of texts and files, and presentsignal generation and data modulation. We test the covert channel and showevaluation results. Finally, we present a set of countermeasures to thisair-gap attack.

COVID-bit: Keep a Distance of (at least) 2m From My Air-Gap Computer!