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Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the ``power of the crowd'' to garnercontributions towards public projects. As these projects are non-excludable,agents may prefer to ``free-ride,'' resulting in the project not being funded.For single project CC, researchers propose to provide refunds to incentivizeagents to contribute, thereby guaranteeing the project's funding. These fundingguarantees are applicable only when agents have an unlimited budget. This workfocuses on a combinatorial setting, where multiple projects are available forCC and agents have a limited budget. We study certain specific conditions wherefunding can be guaranteed. Further, funding the optimal social welfare subsetof projects is desirable when every available project cannot be funded due tobudget restrictions. We prove the impossibility of achieving optimal welfare atequilibrium for any monotone refund scheme. We then study different heuristicsthat the agents can use to contribute to the projects in practice. Throughsimulations, we demonstrate the heuristics' performance as the average-casetrade-off between welfare obtained and agent utility.

Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents: Welfare Optimality at Equilibrium and Optimal Deviation