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Passive light-source side channel in quantum key distribution (QKD) makes thequantum signals more distinguishable thus provides additional information aboutthe quantum signal to an eavesdropper. The explicit eavesdropping strategiesaimed at the passive side channel known to date were limited to the separatemeasurement of the passive side channel in addition to the operational degreeof freedom. Here we show how to account for the joint eavesdropping on bothoperational degree of freedom and the passive side channel of the generic form.In particular, we use the optimal phase-covariant cloning of the signal photonstate, which is the most effective attack on the BB84 protocol without sidechannels, followed by a joint collective measurement of the side channel andthe operational degree of freedom. To estimate QKD security under this attack,we develop an effective error method and show its applicability to the BB84decoy-state protocol.

Joint eavesdropping on the BB84 decoy state protocol with an arbitrary passive light-source side channel