English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Global: Zendy Plus annual

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Global: Zendy Plus monthly

Global: Zendy Tools annual

Global: Zendy Tools monthly

Global: Zendy Free Plan

One of the most widely used models for studying the geographical economics ofclimate change is the Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy(RICE). In this paper, we investigate how cooperation and competition arise inregional climate policies under the RICE framework from the standpoints of gametheory and optimal control. First, we show that the RICE model is inherently adynamic game. Second, we study both cooperative and non-cooperative solutionsto this RICE dynamic game. In cooperative settings, we investigate the globalsocial welfare equilibrium that maximizes the weighted and cumulative socialwelfare across regions. We next divide the regions into two clusters: developedand developing, and look at the social welfare frontier under the notion ofPareto optimality. We also present a receding horizon approach to approximatethe global social welfare equilibrium for robustness and computationalefficiency. For non-cooperative settings, we study best-response dynamics andopen-loop Nash equilibrium of the RICE game. A Recursive Best-responseAlgorithm for Dynamic Games (RBA-DG) is proposed to describe the sequences ofbest-response decisions for dynamic games, which indicates convergence toopen-loop Nash equilibrium when applied to the RICE game by numerical studies.We also study online receding horizon feedback decisions of the RICE game. AReceding Horizon Feedback Algorithm for Dynamic Games (RHFA-DG) is proposed.All these proposed solution concepts are implemented and open sourced using thelatest updated parameters and data. The results reveal how game theory may beused to facilitate international negotiations towards consensus on regionalclimate-change mitigation policies, as well as how cooperative and competitiveregional relations shape climate change for our future.

How Cooperation and Competition Arise in Regional Climate Policies: RICE as a Dynamic Game