English (United Kingdom)

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/featured_content/oa?rat=en

https://curated-unify.zendy.io/wp-json/zendy-region/v1/highlighted_journal/

Zendy Plus

Presents the access of premium content as premium feature

Premium Content

Presents the keyphrase highlighting as premium feature

Keyphrase Highlighting

Presents the summarisation as premium feature

Summarisation

Insights

Presents the pdf analysis as premium feature

PDF Analysis

Presents the zaia usage as premium feature

ZAIA

Zendy Tools

Zendy Open

We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreementoutcome is private (and possibly correlated) information and it is commonknowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that if the Pareto frontieris linear, the outcome of an ex post efficient mechanism cannot depend on thedisagreement payoffs. If the frontier is non-linear, the result continues tohold when the disagreement payoffs are independent or there is a player with atmost two types. We discuss implications of these results for axiomaticbargaining theory and for full surplus extraction in mechanism design.

Two-Person Bargaining when the Disagreement Point is Private Information