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As cache-based side-channel attacks become serious security problems, variousdefenses have been proposed and deployed in both software and hardware.Consequently, cache-based side-channel attacks on processes co-residing on thesame core are becoming extremely difficult. Most of recent attacks then shifttheir focus to the last-level cache (LLC). Although cache partitioning iscurrently the most promising defense against the attacks abusing LLC, it isineffective in thwarting the side-channel attacks that automatically createeviction sets or bypass the user address space layout randomization. In fact,these attacks are largely undefended in current computer systems.  We propose Remapped Cache Layout (\textsf{RCL}) -- a pure hardware defenseagainst a broad range of conflict-based side-channel attacks. \textsf{RCL}obfuscates the mapping from address to cache sets; therefore, an attackercannot accurately infer the location of her data in caches or using a cache setto infer her victim's data. To our best knowledge, it is the first defense tothwart the aforementioned largely undefended side-channel attacks .\textsf{RCL} has been implemented in a superscalar processor and detailedevaluation results show that \textsf{RCL} incurs only small costs in area,frequency and execution time.

Remapped Cache Layout: Thwarting Cache-Based Side-Channel Attacks with a Hardware Defense