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Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in anetwork for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fixthem. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the networkadministrator should properly react to the malicious activities or proactivelyprevent them, by applying suitable countermeasures that minimize the likelihoodof an attack by the attacker. In this paper, we propose a stochasticgame-theoretic approach for analyzing network security and synthesizing defensestrategies to protect a network. To support analysis under partial observation,where some of the attacker's activities are unobservable or undetectable by thedefender, we construct a one-sided partially observable security game andtransform it into a perfect game for further analysis. We prove that thistransformation is sound for a sub-class of security games and a subset ofproperties specified in the logic rPATL. We implement a prototype that fullyautomates our approach, and evaluate it by conducting experiments on areal-life network.

Partially-Observable Security Games for Automating Attack-Defense Analysis