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Today's RKE systems implement disposable rolling codes, making every key fobbutton press unique, effectively preventing simple replay attacks. However, aprior attack called RollJam was proven to break all rolling code-based systemsin general. By a careful sequence of signal jamming, capturing, and replaying,an attacker can become aware of the subsequent valid unlock signal that has notbeen used yet. RollJam, however, requires continuous deployment indefinitelyuntil it is exploited. Otherwise, the captured signals become invalid if thekey fob is used again without RollJam in place. We introduce RollBack, a newreplay-and-resynchronize attack against most of today's RKE systems. Inparticular, we show that even though the one-time code becomes invalid inrolling code systems, replaying a few previously captured signals consecutivelycan trigger a rollback-like mechanism in the RKE system. Put differently, therolling codes become resynchronized back to a previous code used in the pastfrom where all subsequent yet already used signals work again. Moreover, thevictim can still use the key fob without noticing any difference before andafter the attack. Unlike RollJam, RollBack does not necessitate jamming at all.Furthermore, it requires signal capturing only once and can be exploited at anytime in the future as many times as desired. This time-agnostic property isparticularly attractive to attackers, especially in car-sharing/rentingscenarios where accessing the key fob is straightforward. However, whileRollJam defeats virtually any rolling code-based system, vehicles might haveadditional anti-theft measures against malfunctioning key fobs, hence againstRollBack. Our ongoing analysis (covering Asian vehicle manufacturers for thetime being) against different vehicle makes and models has revealed that ~70%of them are vulnerable to RollBack.

RollBack: A New Time-Agnostic Replay Attack Against the Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems