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We investigate a multi-agent decision problem in population games where eachagent in a population makes a decision on strategy selection and revision toengage in repeated games with others. The strategy revision is subject to timedelays which represent the time it takes for an agent revising its strategyneeds to spend before it can adopt a new strategy and return back to the game.We discuss the effect of the time delays on long-term behavior of the agents'strategy revision. In particular, when the time delays are large, the strategyrevision would exhibit oscillation and the agents spend substantial time in"transitioning" between different strategies, which prevents the agents fromattaining the Nash equilibrium of the game. As a main contribution of thepaper, we propose an algorithm that tunes the rate of the agents' strategyrevision and show such tuning approach ensures convergence to the Nashequilibrium. We validate our analytical results using simulations.

Tuning Rate of Strategy Revision in Population Games