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This paper provides a general framework to explore the possibility of agendamanipulation-proof and proper consensus-based preference aggregation rules, sopowerfully called in doubt by a disputable if widely shared understanding ofArrow's `general possibility theorem'. We consider two alternative versions ofagenda manipulation-proofness for social welfare functions, that aredistinguished by `parallel' vs. `sequential' execution of agenda formation andpreference elicitation, respectively. Under the `parallel' version, it is shownthat a large class of anonymous and idempotent social welfare functions thatsatisfy both agenda manipulation-proofness and strategy-proofness on a naturaldomain of single-peaked `meta-preferences' induced by arbitrary totalpreference preorders are indeed available. It is only under the second,`sequential' version that agenda manipulation-proofness on the same naturaldomain of single-peaked `meta-preferences' is in fact shown to be tightlyrelated to the classic Arrowian `independence of irrelevant alternatives' (IIA)for social welfare functions. In particular, it is shown that using IIA tosecure such `sequential' version of agenda manipulation-proofness and combiningit with a very minimal requirement of distributed responsiveness results in acharacterization of the `global stalemate' social welfare function, theconstant function which invariably selects universal social indifference. It isalso argued that, altogether, the foregoing results provide new significantinsights concerning the actual content and the constructive implications ofArrow's `general possibility theorem' from a mechanism-design perspective.

Agenda manipulation-proofness, stalemates, and redundant elicitation in preference aggregation. Exposing the bright side of Arrow's theorem