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This paper is concerned with the epistemic question of confirming ahypothesis -- the guilt of a defendant -- by way of testimony heard by a jurorover the course of an American-style criminal trial. In it, I attempt to settlea dispute between two strands of the legal community over the issue of whetherthe methods of Bayesian rationality are incompatible with jurisprudentialprinciples such as the Presumption of Innocence. To this end, I prove arepresentation theorem that shows that so long as a juror would not convict thedefendant having heard no testimony (the Presumption of Innocence) but wouldconvict upon hearing some collection of testimony (Willingness to Convict),then this juror's disposition to convict the defendant is representable as thedisposition of a Bayesian threshold juror in Posner's sense. This resultindicates that relevant notion of a Bayesian threshold juror is insufficientlyspecified to render this debate a substantive one.

On Rational Jurisprudence: A Problem in Bayesian Confirmation Theory