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In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical framework to investigateadvanced persistent threat problems with two types of insider threats:malicious and inadvertent. Within this framework, a unified three-player gameis established and Nash equilibria are obtained in response to differentinsiders. By analyzing Nash equilibria, we provide quantitative solutions tothe advanced persistent threat problems with insider threats. Furthermore,optimal defense strategy and defender's cost comparisons between two insiderthreats have been performed. The findings suggest that the defender shouldemploy more active defense strategies against inadvertent insider threats thanagainst malicious insider threats, despite the fact that malicious insiderthreats cost the defender more. Our theoretical analysis is validated bynumerical results, including an additional examination of the conditions of therisky strategies adopted by different insiders. This may help the defender indetermining monitoring intensities and defensive strategies.

Defense for Advanced Persistent Threat with Inadvertent or Malicious Insider Threats