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Hardware supply-chain attacks are raising significant security threats to theboot process of multiprocessor systems. This paper identifies a new, prevalenthardware supply-chain attack surface that can bypass multiprocessor secure bootdue to the absence of processor-authentication mechanisms. To defend againstsuch attacks, we present PA-Boot, the first formally verifiedprocessor-authentication protocol for secure boot in multiprocessor systems.PA-Boot is proved functionally correct and is guaranteed to detect multipleadversarial behaviors, e.g., processor replacements, man-in-the-middle attacks,and tampering with certificates. The fine-grained formalization of PA-Boot andits fully mechanized security proofs are carried out in the Isabelle/HOLtheorem prover with 306 lemmas/theorems and ~7,100 LoC. Experiments on aproof-of-concept implementation indicate that PA-Boot can effectively identifyboot-process attacks with a considerably minor overhead and thereby improve thesecurity of multiprocessor systems.

PA-Boot: A Formally Verified Authentication Protocol for Multiprocessor Secure Boot